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Abstract 
Elderly home-owners get institutionalized less often than renters do. We hypothesize that housing 
tenure itself explains this behavior. Using longitudinal data from a Dutch community sample (N= 
2,372) collected between 1992 and 2005, we find a negative effect of housing tenure on the 
probability of moving to a nursing home between two subsequent waves. This effect remains 
significant after controlling for health, socio-economic status and the presence of a partner and or 
children. We could not reduce this finding to a variety of explanations directly related to housing 
tenure. There was no substantial effect of higher payments for long-term care for wealthy people 
before 1997. Neither did we find evidence that home owners have a strategic bequest motive, and 
use their house to attract informal care from their children. We do find that homeowners use 
informal care-at-home to postpone or avoid institutionalization. Homeowners do not appear to 
live in houses more suitable to the needs of old age than renters, they do not have better social 
networks from which they can recruit informal caregivers. However, they express a greater 
satisfaction with their housing situation than renters, even if their health deteriorates. We 
therefore interpret our findings as the result of a strong desire among homeowners to stay where 
they are – in their own property – and better possibilities they have – as owners – to realize this 
desire. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Demand for nursing home care is expected to increase substantially over the coming decades due 
to population aging in many countries. Care-at-home, provided by relatives or professional 
caregivers, is the most important substitute for institutionalization. Many elderly like to stay in 
their homes as long as possible even when their health deteriorates, but there seem to be 
important differences in the possibilities they have for realizing this desire. In particular, it has 
been observed frequently that homeowners have a lower probability of becoming institutionalized 
than renters, also when a large number of control variables are included in the analysis 
(Muramatsu et al. (2007) and Gaugler et al. (2007) for the US, Breeze et al. (2008) for the UK, 
Nihtilä and Martikainen (2007) for Finland). 
This finding is of potential interest since it suggests an external effect of housing tenure 
on the demand for long term health care. If there is a negative effect of homeownership on the 
demand for expensive institutionalized care, the ownership rates of the cohorts that will pass the 
65 year threshold in the coming years may have a substantial impact on the need to provide this 
expensive type of care. However, if the observed relationship between housing tenure and 
demand for residential care would be due to confounding variables, such as a better average 
health status of homeowners, homeownership in itself would be of no interest for health care 
policy. Many existing studies of the demand for long term care use homeownership as a control 
variable and ignore the issue of causality. For instance, in their review of social consequences of 
homeownerships, Dietz and Haurin (2003) find many studies lacking from an econometric 
perspective. In particular, they repeatedly observe a failure to include potentially important 
control variables and a neglect of spurious associations between homeownership and outcome 
variables. 
In this paper we explore the relationship between homeownership and the demand for 
residential care using a rich dataset that allows us to consider a wide variety of variables over 
time in a Dutch community sample of elderly. Our data show a substantially lower transition rate 
of homeowners to institutionalized care, and we investigate the robustness of this finding for the 
incorporation of detailed controls to parcel out compositional effects that could mistakenly be 
interpreted as a causal link between housing tenure and the demand for nursing home care. We 
also consider the impact of effects that are more closely related to ownership of the house one 
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lives in: owning a substantial amount of wealth and living in more luxury housing. The former 
may imply a higher cost of receiving long-term care through social security or the public health 
care system, as well as offer the possibility to avoid institutionalization by making more intensive 
use of care-at-home. The latter may imply that owner-occupiers live in houses that are – on 
average – better suited to the needs of old age than renters.  
In the next section we discuss the two groups of explanatory variables. In section 3 we 
make some remarks about the specificities of the Dutch situation to which our empirical work 
refers. Then we introduce the data and the model. In sections 5 and 6 estimation results are 
reported. In section 7 we investigate if homeowners rely more on intensive care provided home at 
home than renters. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Institutionalization and the demand for long-term-care 
The primary focus of this paper is on institutionalization in nursing homes or related 
institutions1 for the provision of long term care. Differences between the transition rates of 
homeowners and renters to nursing homes could result from compositional effects, as well as 
from structural reasons. Compositional effects occur when people who own their home differ in 
the propensity to become institutionalized for reasons that are only indirectly related to 
homeownership. There are many reasons why such effects may occur. We briefly discuss four of 
them, which are in our view the most important ones. Then we consider three possible causal 
mechanisms associated with homeownership that could explain the link between homeownership 
and lower transition rates that remains after controlling for compositional effects. 
Health status is presumably the main driver of the demand for nursing home care. A wide 
range of physical, mental, and functional health conditions is associated with admission to long 
term care facilities (Fried et al., 2001; Gaugler et al., 2007; Geerlings et al., 2000 Miller and  
Weissert, 2000; Thomese and Broese, 2005). Since there exists a strong relationship between 
health and wealth at old age (Huisman et al., 2005; Broese et al., 2003) and home-owners in 
general are wealthier than renters, they have on average better health. Insufficient control for 
health may therefore easily lead to correlation between homeownership and admission to nursing 
                                                 
1
 The Netherlands have two types of institutions where long term care is provided: nursing homes and sheltered 
housing. The former provides the most intensive types of care. The distinction will be explained in the next section. 
In order to keep the terminology simple, we will refer to both types of institutions as nursing homes, unless it is clear 
from the context that the distinction matters. 
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home that is not based on a causal link between the two variables. It is therefore important to 
control for health status. 
Somewhat related to this observation is the fact that homeowners live with a partner more 
often than others and may also more often live closer to children2 who could provide the care that 
is necessary to postpone or even completely avoid the institutionalization that would otherwise be 
necessary. Since much long-term-care is provided by unpaid caregivers, it is important to control 
for this possibility as well. 
A third possibility for compositional effects is that long-term care is less available in the 
locations where homeowners are concentrated. Even if public health care would guarantee that 
nursing home capacity per 1,000 inhabitants was approximately equal throughout space, 
differences in population density could still cause a much larger physical distance to the nearest 
nursing home, and this might have an impact on transition rates. Since homeowners are more 
often located in areas with relatively low densities, this could also lead to correlation between 
home ownership and transition rates. Moreover, if capacity problems occur in nursing homes, it is 
unlikely that these are evenly spread over space. 
Finally, there is probably a relationship between the strength of neighborhood-based 
social networks and the elapsed duration of stay in the current house or neighborhood. Since 
residential mobility among homeowners is lower than that of renters, and the difference is 
especially large for elderly people,3 this may also give rise to a correlation between 
homeownership and institutionalization that is in fact caused by social network effects. 
The four effects we have mentioned may of course all be present simultaneously and 
many datasets lack the possibility to control for all of them at once. The data used in this paper 
are exceptionally rich in this respect and enable us to take into account all the compositional 
effects mentioned above. 
 
 To the extent that the lower mobility of homeowners is indeed caused by their higher 
costs of realizing a residential move for owners, it may be argued that this lower mobility would 
more properly belong to the second class of explanations: those that are closely related to 
homeownership itself. Indeed, the classification we use here is somewhat arbitrary since the 
                                                 
2
 A surprisingly large number of adults live close to their parents. See Compton and Pollak (2009) for the US and 
Hank (2007) for European countries. 
3
 See Rouwendal (2009), Figure 8. 
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differences in wealth and in the possibility to leave a bequest that will be discussed below may 
also be present among renters. However, since many wealthy households are homeowners and 
the house is in most cases the most important asset of these households, there is in practice a 
strong relationship between wealth and homeownership and this motivates the distinction we use 
here. Being wealthy may have important consequences for the cost of receiving long-term care. 
Moreover, it opens up the possibility to attract informal care to postpone institutionalization, for 
instance by offering the unpaid caregivers the prospect of a bequest. We discuss both effects.   
Moving to an institution may be associated with higher costs for home-owners than for 
renters (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). This is true in the US where low income households are able to 
use social security whereas those with higher incomes have to pay themselves for long-term care 
expenses. Also in the west-European welfare states the patient’s own contribution to received 
(long-term) care is usually dependent on either income or wealth. Moreover, in some countries 
not all institutions providing long-term care are covered by the public health care system in the 
same way. This was the case in the Netherlands (to which our empirical work refers) until 1997. 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next section, since that particular policy change offers 
us the possibility to investigate the effect of higher cost of long term care for homeowners. 
 The – on average - larger wealth of home owners may not only imply a higher cost of 
institutionalization, it provides them also with better means to postpone or avoid this event. A 
possibility that has attracted some attention in the literature is that elderly people may postpone 
institutionalization by deliberately using the prospect of a substantial bequest as an incentive for 
their relatives to provide the care they need (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985). The idea is 
that older people may expect something of their children or other relatives in return for the wealth 
they bequeath to them. The house is usually the largest asset of households, and a luxury house 
obviously signals a large bequest. The prospect of receiving part of the inheritance may 
consciously or unconsciously increase the willingness of relatives to provide services required by 
the older person in need of care. This could imply that children of home-owners, who are the 
usual beneficiaries, provide more informal care that children of renters do.  
A third effect of homeownership on the transition to institutionalized care may be caused by the 
fact that owner occupied housing is usually of a more luxury kind than rental housing. There 
exists a well-established association between housing tenure and investments in home and 
neighborhood (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999; Rohe and Stewart, 1996). This may play out 
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in two ways. Homeowners may not only invest more in their homes at large, but also invest more 
in special adjustments to the house that enable them to stay in their home longer. Second, owners 
may feel more attached to their homes because of the stronger effort invested in the living 
environment, compared to renters (Redfoot, 1987).  
 
3 The Dutch context 
Long term care in the US context differs from acute medical care in four ways: it is care for 
chronic illnesses; the industry is dominated by for-profit facilities; little private long term care 
insurance is purchased; and much long term care is provided by unpaid caregivers, often relatives 
of those who receive care (Norton, 2000). Long term care in the Netherlands is also targeted to 
chronic illnesses, and is mostly provided by unpaid caregivers, but here the industry is dominated 
by not-for-profit facilities. In the Netherlands long term care is provided by the welfare state, 
which means that it is available to all. It is partly funded through (mandatory) collective 
insurance and partly from the revenues of taxes. Those who make use of the system sometimes 
have to pay a (limited) own contribution to its cost. The height of this contribution may depend 
on the receiver’s income or, until 1997, wealth. 
 
3.1 The institutional setting  
The Netherlands is an example of a western European welfare state with substantial involvement 
of the government in health care. Since the 1950s a dual system of long term care evolved that 
lasted until 1997. Intensive types of long-term care were originally provided exclusively by what 
are called in Dutch verpleeghuizen, or nursing homes. Such care is very costly and difficult to 
provide by a private insurance system. For this reason the Dutch government decided to provide 
it through a collective insurance scheme. Nursing homes therefore became – in principle - 
available to all, under the condition that a person’s health condition was such that he or she 
qualified for this type of care.  
For those in need of lower levels of care, a different type of institution evolved, the so-
called verzorgingshuizen, to which we will refer as sheltered housing. Originally this sheltered 
housing (often provided in large apartment buildings) was designated for elderly who could in 
principle continue living independently, but found it convenient to be able to make use of less 
intensive types of care offered by the residential home, like housekeeping and the provision of 
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hot meals. In the early years (until the 1960s), people had to be in good health to be allowed to 
enter into a sheltered housing. Those who did in principle had to pay the full cost of the care 
provided. However, if they at any point in time lacked the wealth to do so the public health care 
system provided assistance from the general means. As a consequence, entrance into sheltered 
housing was possible to all, but wealthy people had to pay a much higher price until they ran out 
of resources. 
Over the years, demand for long-term care increased considerably. Substantial capacity 
and funding problems emerged for nursing homes and sheltered housing was used as a substitute 
for nursing homes in which those elderly whose needs for care were less intensive (compared to 
those admitted to nursing homes) could stay. Starting in the 1980s, the national government 
increasingly restricted admission to both types of residential care to those who were unable to 
receive sufficient care from other sources, mostly care at home. Although there remained a 
distinction between sheltered housing and nursing homes, in practice sheltered housing had 
become part of the public health care system. In the course of the 1990s the government reacted 
to this development by formally incorporating the homes-with-care into the publicly financed 
health care system. This happened in 1997 (Staatscourant, 1996) and from that year onwards, 
there was an income dependent contribution to the cost of care in both nursing homes and 
sheltered housing, which had effectively become nursing homes for those who needed less 
intensive care. Wealthy patients no longer needed to pay the full cost until most of their wealth 
was consumed. 
The obligation for the inhabitants of sheltered housing to consume their wealth almost 
completely before assistance from the public health care system could be claimed was popularly 
known as the necessity to ‘eat one’s house’ and was by many regarded as unfair, since it put a 
penalty on a prudent life style with relatively large savings throughout one’s working age.  When 
in 1997 residential homes became part of the public health system, income-dependent 
contributions became much lower. The cost of long-term care provided in sheltered housing thus 
decreased substantially for many home owners. The large costs of this type of care before 1997 
may well have contributed to the lower propensity of homeowners to become institutionalized. If 
this hypothesis is true, this reluctance should have decreased after the policy change in 1997.  
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3.2 Admission to nursing homes 
The primary determinant for long term care is a person’s health (Miller and Weissert, 2000). In 
principle, this care can be provided in alternative ways, the most important distinction being 
between care-at-home and institutionalization (see, for instance, Woittiez et al., 2009). Care-at-
home can be provided by professional workers, but also by unpaid caregivers, often relatives of 
the recipient. The availability of this substitute thus depends on a person’s family and social 
networks as well as on the intensity of the demand for care. 
Admission to nursing homes and homes-with-care in the Netherlands depends on a 
professional, independent assessment of the person’s health and the associated need for care.4 
This assessment has become increasingly dependent on the availability of care at home. Capacity 
problems in long term care emerged in the late 1980s and gave rise to long waiting lists for 
professional care in both the nursing homes and the homes-with-care. These waiting lists were an 
important cause for policy concern in the 1990s and early 2000s, while the problem seems to 
have been mitigated since then. As long as people were on a waiting list they necessarily had to 
rely on a substitute for residential care: professional care given at home (which is also part of the 
public health care system) or care provided by relatives, most typically the partner, if present and 
able, or adult children. Problems caused by the long lists were mitigated by giving priority to 
people with an acute need for receiving professional care. For some others on the waiting lists the 
substitute was quite satisfactory, as they refused to accept admittance in a nursing or residential 
home after being on the waiting list for some time (van Gameren, 2005). This suggests that, at 
least for a part of those who were are in need of long term care according to expert judgment, 
good alternatives to nursing homes were available. 
 
3.3 The Dutch housing market 
The Dutch housing markets differs from that in many other European countries as well as from 
the US through its large rental sector. According to Eurostat statistics, the percentage of 
homeowners among pensioners in the whole EU was 60% in 1995, as opposed to 43% among the 
Dutch pensioners. The share of homeowners is less than 30% for low incomes and more that 80% 
for high incomes (Rouwendal, 2009). This means that in the Netherlands the link between 
                                                 
4
 This was the case through the period 1992-2007 to which our data refer, although originally admission  to homes-
with care was open to all. 
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housing tenure (the probability of being an owner) and income is stronger than in many other 
countries. 
 Much of the rental housing is social housing owned by housing corporations (35% of the 
total housing stock). Almost all rental housing is rent-controlled. Maximum allowable rents are 
related to the number of quality points for which a house qualifies. Location characteristics are 
hardly reflected in these quality points, which implies that rental housing close to the center of 
urban areas (like Amsterdam) is as cheap as rental housing in rural areas with the same amount 
floor space, number of rooms and other characteristics that are associated with quality points. 
There is excess demand for rental housing in many locations and especially in the urban areas. 
The allocation system for rental housing differs over the country, but everywhere priority is given 
to those most in need of affordable housing. Existing home owners do not easily qualify as such 
and mobility from the owner-occupied to the rental sector is therefore very limited. 
 
4 Data and method  
 
4.1 The database 
Data come from the Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (LASA, www.lasa-vu.nl). LASA is 
an ongoing study on physical, emotional, cognitive and social functioning of older adults, with a 
nationally representative sample (Deeg et al., 2002). In 1992 (t=0), interviewers questioned 3,805 
respondents as part of the Living Arrangements and Social Networks of Older Adults research 
program (LSN; Knipscheer et al. , 1995), which used a stratified random sample of men and 
women born between 1908 and 1937. The oldest individuals, particularly the oldest men, were 
over-represented in the sample, which resulted in approximately equal numbers of men (n = 
1,859) and women (n = 1,946). The sample came from population registers of eleven 
municipalities: the city of Amsterdam and two rural communities in the west of the Netherlands, 
one city and two rural communities in the south, and one city and four rural communities in the 
east. These regions represented the differences in religion and urbanization in the Netherlands at 
the time. Of the 6,107 eligible individuals in the sample, 2,302 (38%) refused cooperation due to 
a lack of interest or time, and another 734 were ineligible because they were deceased or too ill or 
cognitively impaired to be interviewed.  
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In 1992-1993 (t=1, N = 3,107), 1995-1996 (t=2, N = 2,545), 1998-1999 (t=3, N = 2,076), 
2001-2002 (t=4, N = 1,691), and 2005-2006 (t=5, N = 1,257) LASA performed follow-ups. 
Between 1992/3 and 2005/6, 46% of the respondents died, 5% were unable to participate in the 
study because of severe physical or mental health problems, 14% refused to be re-interviewed, 
and 2% could not be contacted because they moved to another country or an unknown address. In 
each wave, the interviewers received a four-day training course and the LASA field work 
manager supervised them intensively. The interviewer tape-recorded the interviews to monitor 
and enhance the quality of the data obtained. The interviews took between one hour and a half 
and two hours. Between observations, mortality was regularly determined on the basis of death 
registers.   
We selected 2,372 respondents with at least 2 observations between 1992/3 and 2005/6, 
who were living independently in 1992/3, and included those who had died between waves. 
Measurement differences between 1992 and 1992/93 precluded using the first wave (t=0). We 
will refer to the 1992/93 wave as t=1 or wave 1, and so on.  We have at most four observations 
for each respondent. For 1,062 respondents this is the case. 486 respondents were observed three 
times and 496 twice. 
 
4.2 Measurements 
Institutionalization. At each observation, the respondent's address was examined to see whether 
he or she had moved in the preceding period. If respondents had moved, we asked in what type of 
housing they lived. Alternatives included a home-with-care or a nursing home. Interviewers also 
observed the housing type. Based on both measurements, a variable was constructed indicating 
whether or not the respondent had moved to an institution between two waves. If a respondent 
had died between waves, it was established whether he or she had been institutionalized before 
death. Short stays in a caring or nursing home were not registered as institutionalization. In our 
data, institutionalization is an absorbing state. Of the 265 transitions to either a home-with-care or 
a nursing home reported in our raw data, 29 were to a nursing home. Mainly because of this small 
share of immediate transitions to a nursing home, we did not distinguish between transitions to 
homes-with-care and nursing homes (in the strict sense of the word). We did not record whether 
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respondents moved from a home-with-care to a nursing home.5 Because of the small number of 
transitions into a nursing home, we collapsed both transitions into one variable indicating 
institutionalization. This may imply that results concerning hypothesis 2a (the effect of the policy 
change) underestimate a true effect.  
Care-at-home. Respondents were asked if they received help with personal care (yes or no). If 
they responded positively, they could indicate up to twelve sources of help, ranging from the 
partner, children and other informal carers to a variety of formal carers. Personal care is defined 
as having at least help with one of the following activities: to wash, to bath or shower, dressing 
and undressing, to go to the toilet, to get up and sit down. The same procedure was followed with 
respect to domestic tasks (no, yes), indicating activities like preparing meals, doing groceries, 
cleaning the house, taking the garbage bags outside, but also filling out forms. If any source of 
care-at-home was mentioned, we considered the respondent to receive care-at-home.  
Housing tenure. In 1992, respondents were asked if they owned their house. Alternatives were 
own property, rented, sublet, free of charge. The first alternative (own property) was scored as 
home ownership. Outright owners have very low out-of-pocket user costs and could therefore be 
expected to stay as long as possible in their home. Owners were asked whether their house was 
free of mortgage. They could answer yes or no. 
Health. To provide a sufficiently complete and concise overview of the respondent’s 
(unobserved) health, we use five indicators which were assessed at each wave:  
(a) Interviewers asked about the presence of seven chronic diseases: lung disease, cardiac disease, 
arteriosclerosis, stroke, diabetes, arthritis and malignant neoplasm. We counted the number of 
chronic conditions mentioned. 
(b) Self reported functional ability is measured as the ability to perform six activities in daily life 
(ADL), e.g., "Can you walk up and down stairs?" The five possible answers were: not at all, only 
with help, with a great deal of difficulty, with some difficulty, and without difficulty. The six 
items constituted hierarchically homogeneous scales at the observations (Loevinger's H ≥ .59), 
which were reliably measured (ρ ≥ .83). The scale ranges from 0 (no disability) to 24 (severe 
disability). 
                                                 
5
 Since the time between subsequent waves is app. 3 years,  it is possible that some of the 29 moves to nursing homes 
were in fact moves to a home-with-care followed by a  move to a nursing home   
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 (c) Cognitive ability is measured with the 30-item Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; 
Folstein et al., 1975). The scale ranges from 0 (minimum ability) to 30 (maximum ability) points.  
(d) Depressive symptoms are assessed with the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D), a 20-item scale (Radloff, 1977) which has been widely used in older populations. 
Scores range from 0 to 60. 
(e) Frailty is indicated by the respondent’s gait speed, measured as the number of seconds needed 
to walk ten feet and back. 
Availability of children. We included the total number of children and the number of living 
children within 30 minutes travel distance reported by the respondents.  To compensate for 
skewness, we used a log transformation in some of the analyses. 
Neighborhood involvement. Respondents were asked for the number of years a respondent has 
been living in the same neighborhood. There also was an extensive identification procedure for 
the personal network of respondents. This included asking for people in the neighborhood with 
whom the respondent had frequent and important contact. For each of the people mentioned, 
respondents could indicate the frequency of contact, ranging from never (1) to daily (8). We 
counted the number of neighbors identified in the network, and the number of neighbors with 
whom the respondent had at least a monthly contact.  
Special adjustments in the house. Respondents could say if they had any of eighteen adjustments, 
ranging from extra banisters to an alarm system or a special lift in the house.  
Satisfaction with housing was measured with a direct question. Households could indicate to be 
dissatisfied (1), not satisfied (2) or satisfied (3) with their current housing situation.  
Control variables.  
Socio-economic status. Institutionalization, housing tenure and health are associated with socio-
economic status. We use educational level and income as indicators. Educational status was 
measured in 1992, as the highest level of education obtained. The nine response categories 
ranged between no school finished at all and a university degree. To improve international 
comparability, the variable was recoded into years of education. Income was asked at each wave 
as the net monthly household income. For respondents living with a partner, the answer was 
multiplied by 0.7 to obtain an individual income. There were twelve categories ranging from a 
class mean of 1,125 Euro/month (in 1992) to 5,570 Euro/month.  
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Presence of partner. The partner is an important source of help, and the loss of a partner can 
trigger institutionalization. Given the health disparities among renters and homeowners, the 
former will be more often without a partner. At each observation, we assessed the presence of a 
partner  in the household. We use the presence of a partner at each wave.  
In 1992, sex and age were recorded. 
Urbanization and region. Housing tenure may be associated with local and regional differences 
that also affect the demand and supply of long-term care. Urbanization may affect the demand, 
which presumably is lower in less urbanized areas. We use a national measure indicating the 
number of addresses per square meter. The scale ranges from 1 (< 500 adresses) to 5 (> 2,500 
adresses). Furthermore, van Gameren (2005) has documented regional differences in the length 
of waiting lists for caring and nursing homes in the Netherlands. He concludes that such 
differences exist and can be substantial. In order to control for the impact of spatial factors, we 
have introduced dummies for the three regions in which respondents were sampled. 
 
4.3 Method 
We concentrate on the transition from living independently to becoming institutionalized and 
develop a duration model to analyze this phenomenon. Since our data are observations at discrete 
points in time we calculate the (conditional) probability that a transition takes place between 
wave t and wave t+1 for t=1..4.6 We use a logit to model the transition probability pt that a 
respondent who is in state 0 at the beginning in wave t will be in state 1 in wave t+1. As 
explanatory variables for the transition probability of respondent i we use his characteristics Xit at 
wave t. Note that information about the respondent in two subsequent waves is needed to 
determine whether a transition has taken place between t and t+1. 
The likelihood for each respondent i who becomes institutionalized between wave T and 
T+1 equals: Π1 	 

 . This respondent may have been observed in later waves 
than T+1 as well, but since he or she is then in a different state, information is not useful for 
estimating the transition probability in which we are interested here. If a respondent is observed 
between waves 1 and T and is not institutionalized, the likelihood of this observation is Π 1 	

. Note that T may be smaller than 4, for instance because the respondent died before 
wave 5. Although the large majority of the respondents is observed from t=1 until a later wave, 
                                                 
6
 This conditional probability is a discrete time hazard. See, for instance, Cameron and Trivedi (2005), pp 602-3. 
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there are also cases in which a respondent is not observed at t=1, but only in later waves. In such 
cases the reason for the lacking observations is partial non response on some of the variables that 
are important for the purposes of the present paper in one or more waves. We have also included 
these observations in the estimations by appropriately adjusting the formulation of the likelihood. 
For instance, if we observe respondent j only in waves 2,3 and 4 and she is institutionalized 
between waves 3 and 4, the likelihood of this observation is 1 	 
 
. 
A major advantage of this approach is that it allows us to introduce time varying 
covariates in a very easy way. This is especially important for health status, which is an important 
predictor of institutionalization. Changes in health care policy are also easy to deal with by 
incorporating time dummies. Individual effects can be introduced into the model through a 
random effects panel  specification.  
 In a first round, we used a stepwise procedure to assess the effects of including each of the 
four confounding effects discussed in section 2 above on the impact of homeownership on the 
hazard of becoming institutionalized. The results of this exercise are reported in the next section. 
In section 6 we deal with the effects that were more closely related to ownership. 
In section 7 we focus on the transition from living independently to either substantial care 
at home or institutionalization. There we use an extension of the model just discussed to three 
states: living independently without consuming substantial care at home, consuming substantial 
care at home, and being institutionalized. This extension is a simple competing risk model. The 
individual likelihoods used in this extended model are completely analogous to those formulated 
above. We use the same explanatory variables in this extended model.  
 
 
5 The robustness of the impact of homeownership on institutionalization 
 
5.1 Descriptives 
Descriptive information on the variables included in the analysis is provided in Table 1. In spite 
of the increasing age of the sample, we do not see a linear increase in the rate of 
institutionalization. The percentage institutionalized hovers around 3% of the respective samples 
at each wave. The use of care at home decreases over time. This indicates selective attrition in the 
sample: the more frail respondents die earlier or are more often unable to complete the interview  
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Table 1 Description of variables in the model (means and percentages) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 
 1992/3 1995/6 1998/9 2001/2002 
N(obs) 2238 2015 1566 1207 
Homeowner (%) 42 42 44 46 
     
Institutionalizeda( %) 2.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 
Use of care at home 2.3% 1.7% 1.0% 0.6% 
Year of birth 1923 (8.4) 1924 (8.3) 1926 (7.8) 1927 (7.1) 
Sex (% women) 52 53 53 53 
Education (#years) 9.0 (3.3) 9.1 (3.4) 9.2 (3.3) 9.4 (3.3) 
     
Frailty 8.0 (3.6) .4 (4.8) 9.3 (5.1) 9.1 (4.5) 
ADL 28.1 (3.6) 27.5 (4.0) 27.3 (4.2) 27.2 (4.0) 
Depressive 7.3 (7.2) 7.8 (7.6) 8.1 (7.1) 8.6 (7.1) 
MMSE 27.4 (2.3) 27.2 (2.7) 27.4 (2.4) 27.4 (2.5) 
Chronic illnesses 0.89 91.0) 1.13 (1.1) 1.28 (1.1) 1.30 (1.0) 
     
Living with partner (%) 71 65 64 63 
# children 3.0 (2.1) 3.0 (2.1) 2.9 (2.0) 2.9 (1.9) 
# Children within 30 min 1.5 (1.3) 1.5 (1.4) 1.4 (1.3) 1.4 (1.2) 
     
Urbanization 2.9 (1.5) 3.0 (1.5) 3.1 (1.4) 3.0 (1.4) 
Region 2.2 (1.1) 2.2 (1.1) 2.2 (1.1) 2.0 (1.3) 
     
Years of residence in 
neighborhood 
23 (17) 24 (17) 25 (18) 25 (17) 
# neighbors 9.9 (8.6) 10.0 (8.8) 10.1 (9.1) 10.2 (8.8) 
# freq contacted nbrs 6.0 (5.6) 5.8 (5.4) 5.8 (5.5) 5.9 (5.5) 
     
# adjustments 0.18 (.39) 1.21 (.41) 1.30 (.46) 1.30 (.46) 
Housing satisfaction 2.88 (.42) 2.90 (.36) 2.91 (.34) 2.92 (.34) 
a
 Institutionalized between this wave and the next. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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than the healthier ones.  
The share of homeowners increases slightly over time. This is partly caused by the selection 
process just noted, but also by the larger propensity of renters to become institutionalized. A very 
small number of respondents have moved from  privately owned to rental housing, but more 
moves in the opposite direction were reported.7 
All health indicators, apart from the MMSE, point at slightly decreasing performance over time. 
The relatively small change in the average value of these variables is, of course, also related to 
selective attrition of those with the worst health condition either through death or being unable to 
fill out the questionnaire. 
Table 2 provides the raw data on institutionalization and housing tenure in our sample. The 
figures in the table confirm that institutionalization occurs much less among homeowners than 
among renters. Among those transiting to an institution, the share of owner-occupiers is much 
lower. Clearly, homeowners differ substantially from renters in their propensity to become 
institutionalized. We will now consider first how much of this difference can be attributed to 
compositional differences between owners and renters. 
 
Table 2 Moves to nursing and residential homes 
 Between waves: 
 1 and 2 2 and 3 3 and 4 4 and 5 
From renting 51 (3.9%) 57 (4.9%) 36 (4.1%) 24 (3.7%) 
From owning 6 (0.6%) 14 (1.7%) 11 (1.6%) 6 (1.1%) 
Total 57 (2.5%) 71 (3.5%) 47 (3.0%) 30 (2.5%) 
The figures in brackets give the moves as percentages of the associated total numbers of observations.   
 
5.2 Estimation results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 3. Our most elementary specification is reported 
in column (1): we only use a constant and a homeownership dummy. The significant negative 
coefficient confirms the findings of Table 2. The second column reports our basic specification in 
which we use dummies for waves t=2, 3, and 4,8 and the individual’s year of birth, sex and 
                                                 
7
 Over the whole period of observation 82 owners moved to the rental sector and 24 renters became owners. 
8
 The role of these dummies is comparable to that of a flexible baseline hazard in continuous duration models. 
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education as explanatory variables. Incorporation of these time and cohort dummies implies that 
we cannot also include the respondent’s age as an explanatory variable.9 The results of this 
second model suggest that the probability of becoming institutionalized increased over the years. 
The year of birth has a strongly significant negative effect, implying that younger cohorts have a 
much lower propensity to become institutionalized. Women have a substantially larger propensity 
of becoming institutionalized, while more education has the opposite effect. The coefficient for 
homeownership drops substantially, but remains significant. 
We noted above that the absence of control variables causes potentially serious bias in the 
coefficient of the homeownership dummy. To see if and to what extent this is indeed the case, we 
introduce four sets of such control variables. We start with what are arguably the most important 
variables in this respect: the health status indicators. Estimation results in column (3) show that 
frailty (measured as low walking speed) is positively related to becoming institutionalized, while 
high scores (= better performance) on ADL and MMSE indicators are negatively correlated with 
institutionalization. Respondents reporting chronic illnesses and depressive symptoms do not 
become institutionalized more frequently. The coefficients for the time dummies are all much 
smaller and insignificant, which suggests that they mainly picked up the effects of deteriorating 
health in the previous specification. The coefficient for the year of birth also becomes smaller, 
but remains highly significant. Sex and education are no longer significant, which may be 
interpreted as saying  that our  health care  indicators control effectively for health effects that are  
correlated with these two variables. The effect of homeownership on institutionalization is 
reduced to 50% of its value in the earlier model, but it remains negative and significant. 
In the next variant of the model we introduce the presence of a partner in the household 
and the logarithm of (the number of children +1).10 Column 4 reports estimation results. Only the 
dummy indicating the presence of a partner has a significant coefficient. Again, the coefficient 
for homeownership decreases somewhat, but it remains significant with a (robust) t-ratio of 2.8. 
We have experimented with several other indicators for the effect of children (a dummy for 
having at least one child, the (untransformed) number of children, the number of children living 
within 30 minutes of travel time and the number of children living with the respondent). 
However, the estimated coefficients for these alternative variables were never significant. 
                                                 
9
 The reason is that there is a linear relationship between time, age and year of birth. 
10
 This variable is equal  to 0 when the number of children equals 0, and increases less than proportionally with the 
number of children. 
Homeownership and long-term care 
17 
 
Table 3  Estimation results of a discrete time transition model for institutionalization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -3.12 (.08) -0.17 (.33) 4.62 (.83) 4.32 (.88) 
Wave 2  0.44 (.19) 0.16 (.19) 0.14 (.19) 
Wave 3  0.56 (.21) 0.15 (.22) 0.13 (.23) 
Wave 4  0.72 (.24) 0.24 (.26) 0.09 (.28) 
Year of birth  -0.17 (.01) -0.12 (.01) -0.11 (.01) 
Gender  0.35 (0.16) 0.18 (.18) 0.05 (.19) 
Education  -0.054 (.026) 0.008 (.03) 0.02 (.03) 
     
Homeowner (y/n) -1.26 (.18) -0.64 (.19) -0.61 (.20) -0.59 (.23) 
 
Health indicators 
# Chr. Illnesses    -0.03 (.07) -0.01 (.07) 
ADL (lo-hi)   -0.081 (.02) -0.078 (.02) 
MMSE (lo-hi)   -0.15 (.02) -0.15 (.02) 
Depressive (lo-hi)   -0.00 (.01) -0.00 (.01) 
Frailty   0.027 (.01) 0.030 (.01) 
 
Demographic indicators 
Partner present   -0.43 (.20) -0.41 (.20) 
Log (# children+1)   0.15 (.13) 0.11 (.13) 
 
Supply controls 
Urbanisation    Yes 
Region    Yes 
 
Social network indicators 
Years in nbrhd    0.001 (.004) 
 
    
N(resp) 2372 2372 2372 2372 
N(obs) 7026 7026 7026 7026 
Loglikelihood -756.7 -706.5 -703.6 -695.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The number of respondents refers to the number of persons that we observe in 
at least two subsequent waves and that provided enough information to include them in our model. The number of 
observations is the number of times respondents provided sufficient information in subsequent waves to include this 
information into our estimation model. See the Appendix. 
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We control for availability of long term care by introducing dummies for the regions in 
which our respondents were living and for the degree of urbanization of their municipality of 
residence. Differences in supply due to differences in population density or regional capacity 
problems should be captured by these variables. However, none of the coefficients for the 
dummies that we introduce are significant. We introduce 8 dummy variables and the 
loglikelihood increases by approximately 8 points; the implied p-value is just over 5%. The 
coefficient for the homeownership dummy hardly changes. 
This remains the case of a variable indicating the social (neighborhood) capital of the 
respondent is introduced. In column (4) of Table we have taken the number of years a respondent 
has been living in his or her present neighborhood, but similar results (an insignificant coefficient 
for the social capital indicator) were reached when we included the number of neighbors or the 
number of neighbors with whom the respondent has frequent contacts. 
In order to better take into account the panel nature of the data, all model specifications 
have been rerun with a random effects logit model. This resulted in very modest changes of the 
estimated coefficients. In particular, the coefficient for homeownership hardly changed and was 
significant in all model variants. 
A final concern we addressed is that homeowners may first move to the rental sector 
when their health deteriorates, and subsequently become institutionalized. This could bias our 
results with respect to homeownership. We therefore constructed a new variable that indicated if 
a respondent has been observed as a homeowner in the previous or present wave and used this 
variable instead of the homeownership dummy that indicates homeownership in the present 
wave. The effect is this change is that renters who were previously observed as owners are now 
treated as if they still were owners. The results of the modified model were similar to those of the 
original one. In the most extensive model (column 4) the homeownership coefficient increases in 
absolute value to -0.68 (the standard error remains .23). We conclude that our results are not 
biased by selective movement to the rental sector of homeowners in bad health. 
Summarizing, we have to conclude that after controlling for four potentially important 
compositional effects, we still find a statistically significant negative effect of homeownership on 
the institutionalization hazard. The effect is also significant from an economic point of view. The 
average institutionalization probability is 0.0292, and the marginal effect of homeownership on 
the probability of becoming institutionalized is -0.0057, implying a decrease of 20%.  It appears 
Homeownership and long-term care 
19 
 
therefore that homeownership, or some mechanism closely related to it, is responsible for a 
substantial part of the correlation between housing tenure and institutionalization. The next 
section provides a closer examination of three possibilities. 
 
 6 Prices, bequests and quality differences 
 
6.1 Homeownership and the cost of care 
The policy change in 1997 implies a major decrease of the cost of care in sheltered housing for 
people owning a non negligible amount of wealth. This group includes virtually all homeowners 
since very few elderly people have large amounts of mortgage debt. Given the size of the change, 
one can easily imagine a measurable effect on the institutionalization rates. There exists some 
casual evidence about families who took care of their parents until their health was deteriorated 
so much that immediate admission to a nursing home had become necessary, while most people 
who cannot receive the required care at home first move to sheltered housing.  
We documented in section 4 that only a small fraction of the respondents in our data who 
became institutionalized (reported to have) moved to a nursing home immediately and it makes 
no sense to analyze this group separately.11 We would expect that homeowners made the 
transition to institutionalized care (either in a nursing home or sheltered housing) less often than 
renters in otherwise comparable circumstances due to the much higher price they had to pay. 
Since the policy change took place in 1997, we expect especially that this had an impact on the 
hazard of becoming institutionalized between the first and second wave (in 1992/3 and 1995/6, 
respectively). To test for the presence of this effect, we included a dummy that indicates the cross 
effect of being a homeowner and the dummy indicating wave 1. We use the model of column (3) 
in Table 3 as our reference. 
 Estimation results for the homeownership dummy and the cross effect of the extended 
model are reported in Table 4. The column indicated by (3) in that table repeats some results of 
the analogous column in Table 3. Column (4) refers to the extension just discussed. The 
coefficient estimated for the cross-effect has the expected negative sign. It is significant at the 
10% level, but not at the 5% level. The coefficient for the homeownership dummy is now 
                                                 
11
 Less than 50% of the institutionalized respondents indicate whether they are in sheltered housing or in a nursing 
home. Of those who provide this information 14% indicates (a total of 30 observations, including those who are in a 
nursing home in more than ones wave) to be in a nursing home. 
Homeownership and long-term care 
20 
 
insignificant, even at the 10% level. This result may be interpreted as weak evidence in favor of 
the hypothesis that homeowners were more reluctant than renters to enter institutionalized care 
before 1997.  
 
Table 4 Impacts of the policy change in 1997 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Homeowner -0.61 (.20) -0.37 (.23) -0.29 (.30) -0.85 (.42) -0.84 (.26) 
Homeowner*(w1)  -0.87 (.48)    
Outright owner     0.53 (.48) 0.71 (.51) 
Outright owner*(w1)    -0.84 (.52)  
Homeowner*(w1+w2)   -0.49 (.40)   
Outright owner*(w1+w2)     -0.66 (.43) 
      
 7026 7026 7026 7021 7021 
Loglikelihood -703.60 -701.60 -702.50 -701.44 -701.90 
 
 
 To further explore this issue, we estimated a variant of the model in which the cross effect 
of being a homeowner and waves 1 and 2 was included as an additional variable. The idea behind 
this specification is that also between the second and third waves institutionalization of 
homeowners was less likely to be observed as the policy change was only effective in the last part 
of this period. However, estimation results, reported in column (5), do not confirm this 
conjecture. The coefficient for the cross effect and the coefficient for the homeownership dummy 
are now both insignificant at the 10% level. 
  Since one may conjecture that especially homeowners with a large amount of 
home equity would be sensitive to the higher cost of long term care, we formulated a third model 
in which the interaction between outright ownership (having no mortgage loan) and wave 1 is 
included. The results of estimating this model, in which also a dummy for outright 
homeownership was included, are reported in column (6). The coefficient for the cross effect is 
insignificant (the p-value is .107) but the homeownership dummy is now significant. Extending 
the cross effect to wave 2 does not improve the model. 
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  We must therefore conclude that we can find only very weak evidence that the higher cost 
of care in sheltered housing caused the lower transition rates to institutionalized care of 
homeowners. We have also checked these results by using a random effects panel data 
specification for the logit model, and found only marginal changes in the estimation results. 
 
Table 5 Impacts of children 
 (3) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Homeowner -0.61 (.20) -1.48 (.64) -1.04 (.46) -0.57 (.28) -0.63 (.21) 
Ch1  -0.03 (.27)    
Ch2 0.15 (.13)  0.08 (.14)   
Ch3    0.11 (.58)  
Ch4     -0.61 (.63) 
Homeowner*ch1  1.03 (.67)    
Homeowner*ch2   0.37 (.32)   
Homeowner*ch3    -0.02 (.13)  
Homeowner*ch4     1.04 (.87) 
      
 7026 7026 7026 7021 7021 
Loglikelihood -703.6 -702.5 -702.5 -702.1 -703.2 
Legend: ch1=at least one child, ch2=log(number of children+1), ch3=log(number of children at travel distance < 30 
min), ch4=at least one child living with respondent 
 
6.3 A strategic bequest motive? 
Our data permit us to investigate a strategic bequest motive by extending the model of the 
previous section with cross effects of homeownership and variables related to the presence of 
children. We used four indicators of the possible effect of children: an indicator for the 
respondent having at least one child (ch1), the logarithm of the number of children plus one 
(ch2), the number of children living at less then 30 min. travel time (ch3) and an indicator for at 
least one child living with the respondent (ch4).  We used the model of column (3) of Table 3 
again as our reference. The variants we considered have one of the four variables just discussed 
and their product with the homeownership dummy as explanatory variables. Estimations results 
are presented in Table 5. 
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 The cross effects are never significant and have the wrong sign in three out of four cases. 
When the number of children living close to the respondent is used, the cross effect has the 
expected sign, and the coefficient of the uncrossed indicator is almost significant at the 5% level. 
It is clear therefore that the strategic bequest motive finds no support in our data. If anything, the 
data suggest that children have a positive effect on the propensity to move to a nursing home.  
 
 
6.4 More suitable houses? 
Our last set of hypotheses concerns the greater investment of owners in the quality of their 
homes and in special adjustments that enable continuing to live independently. Table 6 
summarizes relevant characteristics. The first panel of this table shows that homeowners live in a 
detached house far more often than renters. These detached houses are often ‘empty nests’ with 
plenty of room and a garden which presumably become more of a burden to live in when health 
deteriorates. Nevertheless, 30% of the homeowners lived in such houses in all four waves. 
The second panel refers to houses that are especially designed for elderly people, and 
shows that only 2% of the owners live in such housing, while 10-15% of the renters do so. The 
third panel shows the percentage of respondents that moved to a house that has all rooms on the 
same floor. (This information was not available for the whole sample.) Less than 50% of those 
moving to an owner occupied house do so, which contrasts sharply with the more than 75% of 
the respondents who moved to a rental house with this characteristic. Finally, we see that 10-20% 
of the owners have special adjustments in their house, whereas 20-40% of the renters have this 
type of facilities. For both groups the share of households living in a house with special 
adjustments increase over time, which suggests that these adjustments are made in response to 
health problems. 
To further investigate the possible effect of housing type on institutionalization we have 
included dummies for detached housing and elderly housing in the most elaborate version of our 
basic model (see column 4 of Table 3). Both coefficients had the expected sign (positive for 
detached housing and negative for elderly housing) but were very far from significant. These 
findings are possibly biased by endogeneity of housing type choice (when health deteriorates, one 
may move to elderly housing to avoid institutionalization). However, both intuition and our data 
point to the fact that owners are overrepresented in housing types that make institutionalization 
somewhat more likely, rather than less. For this reason it seems highly improbable that we can 
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explain the lower propensity of homeowners to become institutionalized by elaborating on the 
choice of the housing type. 
 
Table 6 Some characteristics of owner-occupied and rental housing  
Characteristic Housing 
tenure 
Wave 
  1 2 3 4 
Detached 
 Owners 29 31 30 30 
 Renters 3 2 2 2 
Elderly housing 
 Owners 2 2 2 2 
 Renters 11 14 15 13 
House with all rooms on the same floor (recent movers only) 
 Owners 41 40 56 35 
 Renters 77 77 76 86 
Special adjustments 
 Owners 12 14 21 20 
 Renters 22 27 36 38 
Legend: the figures give the percentages of the respondents in the specific type of  
housing conditional on tenure type. 
 
 
To get some insight into the determinants of the presence of special adjustments in the 
house, we estimated a linear probability panel data model. Table 7 reports results from a random 
and fixed effects specification. The random effects specification shows that homeowners live less 
often in a house with special adjustments after controlling for health and socio-economic 
variables. The fixed effects specification provides interesting additional evidence because the 
significant negative coefficient for homeownership shows that moving from owning to renting 
implies a larger probability of moving towards a house with special adjustments than moving in 
the opposite direction. This suggests that the need for special adjustments in the house induces 
some owners to move to the rental sector. Alternatively, it could be the case that elderly that 
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move to the rental sector for reasons unrelated to health (for instance, the desire to consume their 
home equity, as suggested by Artle and Varaiya (1978)), often choose a house that is suitable for 
the needs of old age because of the presence of special adjustments. Since the number of moves 
from the owner-occupied sector to the rental sector is very small, we did not investigate this issue 
further.  
 
Table 7 Special adjustments  
 Random effects Fixed effects 
Constant  0.80 (.08)  0.69 (.13) 
Wave 2  0.02 (.01)  0.03 (.01) 
Wave 3  0.10 (.01)  0.10 (.01) 
Wave 4  0.12 (.01)  0.12 (.02)  
Year of birth -0.007 (.001)    - 
   
Homeowner 
(n/y) 
-0.85 (.01)  -0.17 (.04) 
   
Walk   0.0038 (.001)  0.0040 (.002) 
ADL (lo-hi) -0.0200 (.001) -0.0138 (.003) 
Depressive (lo-
hi) 
-0.0014 (.001) -0.0019 (.003) 
MMSE (lo-hi) -0.0022 (.002) -0.0032 (.003) 
# Chr. Illnesses   0.0052 (.006)  0.0039 (.010) 
 
  
Gender  0.03 (.01)    - 
Education -0.00 (.00)    - 
Partner present -0.02 (.01) -0.03 (.03) 
Log (# children)  0.03 (.01)   - 
N 7419 
 
A final hypothesis to be considered in this section is that homeowners are more attached to their 
current housing situation than renters and for this reason are more reluctant to move. In our data 
the elderly homeowners are less mobile on the housing market than renters, as has been observed 
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earlier in the literature. However, we have already seen that the years spent in the present 
neighborhood, which is closely related to the duration of stay in the present house, does not affect 
the propensity to move to institutionalized care. 
 
Table 8 Satisfaction with current housing situation 
 Random effects Fixed effects 
Constant  2.96 (.09)  2.99 (.13) 
Wave 2  0.03 (.01)  0.03 (.01) 
Wave 3  0.05 (.01)  0.04 (.01) 
Wave 4  0.06 (.01)  0.04 (.02)  
Year of birth -0.002 (.001)    - 
   
Homeowner (n/y)  0.091 (.01)   0.05 (.04) 
   
Walk  -0.0014 (.001)  0.0018 (.002) 
ADL (lo-hi) -0.0005 (.001) -0.0017 (.003) 
Depressive (lo-hi) -0.0074 (.001) -0.0039 (.001) 
MMSE (lo-hi) -0.0003 (.002) -0.0019 (.004) 
# Chr. Illnesses   0.0033 (.005)  0.0026 (.011) 
 
  
Gender  0.03 (.01)    - 
Education -0.00 (.00)    - 
Partner present -0.01 (.01)  0.03 (.03) 
Log (# children)  0.01 (.01)   - 
 
  
N 7419 
 
 
Our respondents also report their satisfaction with  the current housing situation, which 
presumably reflects attachment to the current house at least as well as the duration of stay. 
However, a possible concern with this variable is that it may be highly endogenous in the sense 
that deteriorating health and the need to receive substantial care almost automatically leads to 
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decreased satisfaction with one’s current housing situation. To investigate this issue, we carried 
out a simple panel data regression on expressed housing satisfaction. Housing satisfaction is 
measured in three classes, and a large majority of the respondents indicates being very satisfied 
with their present housing situation. Although the variation in the dependent variable is therefore 
limited, we undertook a panel data analysis.  
Results are reported in Table 8. In the random effects regression the coefficient on the 
homeownership dummy is positive and strongly significant. Owners are significantly more 
satisfied with their current housing situation than renters, as we expected. The coefficient of the 
fixed effect regression, whose value is determined by moves between the two sectors, is also 
positive, but insignificant. Those who move from the owner-occupied to the rental sector do not 
express higher satisfaction with their housing situation afterwards. Depressive symptoms are the 
only health variable that significantly affects housing satisfaction. Difficulties with walking or a 
low ADL score, which may make it more difficult to continue living in large houses are not 
reflected in lower expressed satisfaction with one’s current housing situation. 
 The most important aspect of these results is that health does hardly affect expressed 
satisfaction with one’s house. This makes it more likely that this variable is a good indicator of 
one’s attachment to the current housing situation. To see if expressed housing satisfaction can 
help explain the lower propensity to become institutionalized of homeowners, we have included 
this variable into the most extensive version of the basic model (see column 4 of Table 3). 
Although we found a coefficient with the expected negative sign, it was far from significant. 
 
7 Care-at-home 
Our results so far indicate that homeowners have a lower institutionalization hazard than renters, 
conditioning on a number of health indicators. Financial motivations play a modest role in this 
process, and we found no indication that the subjective and objective quality of the home is 
relevant. An implication of this finding is that homeowners can avoid institutionalization when 
their health condition is so bad that most renters would become institutionalized.  It seems 
probable that they are able to do so by using some types of care-at-home. This is investigated in 
the present section. 
We now distinguish three states instead of two: independent living without substantial 
care-at-home (0), being institutionalize (1) and independent living with a substantial amount of 
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care (2). We reformulate the duration model by specifying the hazards of a transition from state 0 
to either state 1 or 2 as a multinomial logit model.  ‘Failure’ is now defined as either 
institutionalization or receiving more than 40 hours care-at-home. The 40 hours per month 
threshold is used because it is clear that not all care-at-home can reasonably be regarded as a 
substitute for institutionalization. Care-at-home may be provided by professional caregivers, but 
also by the partner, by children or by other relatives. 
 
Table 9 Transitions to institutionalization and substantial care-at-home   
From To Between waves: 
  1 and 2 2 and 3 3 and 4 4 and 5 
 Renting Inst 51 (4.0%) 57 (4.9%) 35 (4.1%) 22 (3.5%) 
 Care-at-home 15 (1.2%) 14 (1.2%) 8 (0.9%) 5 (0.8%) 
Owning Inst 6 (0.7%) 14 (1.8%) 11 (1.7%) 4 (0.8%) 
 Care-at-home 34 (3.2%) 20 (2.5%) 7 (1.1%) 2 (0.4%) 
Total Inst 57 (2.6%) 71 (3.6%) 46 (3.1%) 26 (2.2%) 
 Care-at-home 49 (2.3%) 34 (1.7%) 15 (1.0%) 7 (0.6%) 
 
 The numbers of transitions to states (1) and (2) is given in Table 9. For renters the 
transition rates to institutionalization are consistently higher than to substantial care-at-home, 
whereas for owners we see the reverse pattern. This suggests strongly that some owners use care-
at-home in situation in which renters become institutionalized. Another remarkable aspect of the 
figures presented in Table 9 is that the total number of transitions to institutionalized care is 
almost as large as in Table 2. This implies that only in a few cases we observe respondents who 
consume a substantial amount of care in one wave and are institutionalized in a later wave. In 
most cases respondents either take care-at-home (and do not become institutionalized) or become 
institutionalized. In part this is due to the nature of our data: when we observe that a respondent is 
institutionalized in a particular wave t, it is probable that he or she received a substantial amount 
of care-at-home during the period of waiting until a place in a caring or nursing home became 
available, but we do not observe this when this episode started after wave t-1. However, care-at-
home during such a transitory stage is of limited interest for the purposes of the present analysis. 
Much more interesting are the cases in which respondents avoid becoming institutionalized by 
receiving care-at-home or to postpone it for a number of years rather than a few months while 
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waiting for institutionalization, and this seems to happen in quite a few cases, especially among 
homeowners, as we expected. 
Table 10 Estimation results of a discrete time transition model for institutionalization and 
care-at-home  
 Model 1 (all care-at-home)  Model 2 (care-at-home includes 
professional care) 
 Institutionalization Care-at-home  Institutionalization Care-at-home 
Constant 5.95 (.89) 2.17 (1.7)  4.23 (.86) -0.31 (3.3) 
Wave 2 0.14 (.19) -0.29 (.24)  0.13 (.19) 0.66 (.60) 
Wave 3  0.04 (.23) -0.89 (.32)   0.09 (.22) 0.40 (.68) 
Wave 4 -0.06 (.29) -1.39 (.24)  -0.11 (.27) 0.84 (.75) 
Year of birth -0.11 (.01) -0.02 (.02)  -0.11 (.01) -0.14 (.04) 
      
Homeowner (n/y) -0.54 (.21) 0.69 (.23)  -0.53 (.20) 0.44 (.47) 
      
Walk  0.04 (.01) 0.04 (.02)  0.04 (.01) 0.02 (.03) 
ADL (lo-hi) -0.08 (.02) -0.10 (.03)  -0.08 (.02) -0.13 (.06) 
Depressive (lo-hi)  -0.01 (.01) -0.04 (.02)   -0.00 (.01) -0.07 (.04) 
MMSE (lo-hi) -0.16 (.02) -0.02 (.04)  -0.15 (.02) -0.04 (.08) 
# Chr. Illnesses  0.02 (.07) 0.06 (.10)  0.03 (.07) 0.25 (.17) 
 
     
Gender -0.01 (.20) -1.53 (.27)  -0.01 (.20) -0.45 (.47) 
Education 0.01 (.03) 0.06 (.03)  0.02 (.03) 0.01 (.08) 
Partner present -0.41 (.20) 1.18 (.37)  -0.45 (.20) 1.34 (.58) 
Log (# children+1) 0.21 (.13) 0.53 (.23)  0.18 (.13) 0.30 (.43) 
 
     
N 6767  7009 
Loglikelihood -1136.8  -819.34 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
Estimation results of this extended duration model are presented in Table 9, in the 
columns indicated as model 1. The specification is similar to that of column (4) in the univariate 
model of Table 3. The most important result is that, after controlling for a number of other 
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variables, homeowners appear to substitute care-at-home for institutionalization as is indicated by 
the significant positive coefficient for homeownership in the care-at-home column. The estimated 
coefficients for the transition to institutionalized care are of the same order of magnitude as in 
that univariate model, as we expected on the basis of the information provided in Table 10.  
The coefficients referring to health indicators are similar for both types of care except 
MMSE, which we interpret as confirming our belief that both types of care are substitutes in 
many situations. It seems plausible that care-at-home is not a good substitute for institutionalized 
care when someone’s cognitive abilities are seriously deteriorated. The coefficients of the socio-
economic variables are much different for the two types of care. Clearly gender differences, and 
the presence of a partner and children affect the need for care by other persons. Another 
interesting aspect of the model is the downward trend in the coefficients for the time dummies, 
which probably reflects the diminishing generosity of the public health system in providing long 
term care. 
 One possible concern with this extended model is that care-at-home can mean a lot of 
different things, and many of them cannot be properly regarded as substitutes for the types of care 
provided in caring or nursing homes. For this reasons it seems worthwhile to see if the results just 
discussed are robust against a more restrictive definition of care-at-home. It seems especially 
relevant to require that some of the care received at home should be provided by professional 
care givers.  
Estimation results for an alternative model in which this requirement is imposed are 
presented in the columns indicated as model 2 in Table 9. There are now more observations, 
because we have a more restrictive criterion for substantial care-at-home. However, there are few 
respondents that move to the more strictly defined state of care-at-home: over the whole period of 
observation their total number is 23, 13 of them being renters. The coefficient of the dummy for 
homeownership in the care-at-home alternative is now insignificant, indicating that homeowners 
do not consume more of this type of care than renters, controlling for health and socio-economic 
variables. Note, however, that the standard errors of the estimated coefficients in the care-at-
home alternative are much larger in model 2 than they were in model 1. This makes it hard to 
draw firm conclusions from model 2. 
 As an alternative sensitivity check, model 1 has been re-estimated with other threshold 
levels for the monthly hours of care-at-home (80 and 120 hours per month). The idea behind 
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these specifications is that care-at-home can only be regarded as a substitute for care offered in an 
institutional setting when it is a substantial amount of care. In both alternative models a negative 
and significant coefficient for institutionalization of the same order of magnitude, and a positive 
coefficient for care-at-home of a smaller magnitude. If the 80 hours threshold is used the 
coefficient for homeownership in the care-at-home alternative is significant at the 10% level, but 
not at the 5% level, if the 120 hours per month threshold is used it is significant at both levels. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 By taking into account a wide array of possible explanations, this study has enabled us to 
develop and test a large number of hypotheses about the mechanism behind the differences in 
institutionalization between renters and owners. The LASA study is not only unique in its 
breadth, but also offers a panel spanning over fifteen years, allowing the incorporation of historic 
change.  Some limitations need mentioning nevertheless. Foremost, sample attrition is a problem 
in collecting these data. Although great care has been taken in the data collection to include 
information from the more frail respondents through proxy interviews and post mortem 
information, we disproportionally lack data from respondents who are at high risk of becoming 
institutionalized.  A second limitation is that we did not dispose of detailed information on the 
wealth of the respondents. The value of their home equity, and the value of other assets may shed 
more light on specific cost motives. It seems unlikely, however, that the robust relationship 
between homeownership and institutionalization we repeatedly found is caused by these data 
limitations.  
The conclusion that remains is that elderly homeowners succeed in realizing lower 
transition rates to institutionalized care after all the possible explanatory factors considered in the 
present paper have been taken into account. Even if living in a large house limits access to care-
at-home and makes adaptations more costly (as is indicated by Easterlow and Smith, 2004), most 
elderly homeowners appear to just want to continue living in the current house which is relatively 
often a detached house, and they appear to be able to do so.  
Our interpretation of these findings is that most elderly owner-occupiers actively try to 
stay in their house as long as possible. That is, they do not want to move to any other dwelling or 
nursing or residential home. A probable reason is that the cost of moving house – and especially 
its non-monetary part, the effort involved in realizing the move and becoming settled in a new 
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environment -  increases substantially with age and with decreasing health. In other words, the 
costs of moving rise at the same time when its potential benefits go up. The success of home-
owners in delaying institutionalization increasingly becomes a obstacle against 
institutionalization in itself. There is a strong preference among the elderly for aging in place 
even if objective measures indicate that this place is becoming less suitable for them. It is then 
perhaps no surprise that this effect is much stronger for homeowners who have to leave behind 
their own property when becoming institutionalized, often for the remainder of their life. 
Moreover, homeowners appear to be more persistent in trying to realize their desire to stay in the 
house in which they often lived for a very long time than renters. Being the owner, they probably 
have a larger say in the decision to stay where they are than renters have in otherwise comparable 
circumstances. Moreover, as owners they have learned to be more self-reliant in housing issues 
than renters.       
If this interpretation is correct, there are good reasons to facilitate the apparently strong 
preference for aging in place among elderly homeowners. This may not only be in their own best 
interest, but it will probably also have a mitigating effect on the demand for long term care which 
is expected to increase substantially in the coming decades. Following this suggestion could 
mean that more possibilities are offered for receiving long term care-at-home. This does not 
necessarily imply that more public money has to be spent: the often considerable amount of home 
equity accumulated by the elderly can probably be used to help finance such arrangements. The 
present-day (and future) elderly differ from earlier generations in pension and other wealth, in 
expected remaining life time, and also in their demand for care. It seems probable that the 
demand (willingness to pay) for personalized care arrangements will increase and that creative 
arrangements to use the home equity to make it effective are in principle attractive for all parties 
involved. 
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